

RUNNING HEAD: Who's the Biggest Demagogue?

O Beautiful Border Wall, Who's the Biggest Demagogue of All? President Trump's Populist Tweet-Storm Blows Away His U.S. and Global Counterparts

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Abstract

In his two and a half years in office (January 21, 2017 to July 21, 2019) President Trump sent 9,122 tweets. During this time he used terms that have been associated with demagogic rhetoric that both divides his audience and sets up an “us” versus “them” antagonism for his own political advantage. This study compared Trump’s Twitter rhetoric in terms of demagogic content and frequency across seven key terms to a then field of twenty-five Democratic presidential candidates for 2020, as well as to several members of Trump’s cabinet and administration. The study further compared seventeen nationally influential political figures and eleven global leaders who were active on Twitter during the same time period. Finally, the study looked at key hashtags, pet phrases, and “I” statements made by the president which may evidence his demagogic traits. The history and characterization of demagogic rhetoric is explored, and complexity-extremity theory is used to explain the effect of “us” versus “them” appeals in political communication. Ultimately, President Trump was found to use demagogic verbiage more widely and on a far more frequent basis than a vast field of his American peers and international contemporaries.

demagogue (noun) dem·a·gogue | \ 'de-mə-,gäg \
a leader who makes use of popular prejudices and false claims and promises in order to gain power (Merriam-Webster, 2019)

Demagoguery Re-Evaluated

Despite its rather straightforward definition, the use of the word “demagogue” and its various iterations (e.g., demagoguery, demagogic) has historically conjured up a host of complex, even contradictory, images (Mendes, 2016). In fact, it was not until the twentieth century that the term began to be used to cast suspicion on the rhetoric of the powerful and to critically analyze their motives (see Lomas, 1961). Recently, however, the word that has so effectively cast a negative light on speakers has also begun to bring critics’ use of it under scrutiny (Roberts-Miller, 2005). Darsey (2006) noted, as did Roberts-Miller, that academic research in the area of demagoguery has waned, dropping off precipitously after the 1960s and, by the turn of the century, was nearly nonexistent, a “lacuna,” in the literature, as Darsey (p. 463) put it.

In one sense, the term has fallen out of favor with modern rhetoricians (Roberts-Miller, 2005; Johnson, 2017; see also Goldzwig, 2006) who feel its use is archaic and not appropriate for today’s complex, culturally sensitive audiences and is, in effect, a self-defeating tactic to employ. In another sense, scholars have eschewed the term because of its ambiguity and ineffectiveness as an analytic tool or for being too much of a hammer in an age where more precise instruments are favored (see Darsey, 2006). Finally, politicians, pundits, and analysts have tried to distance themselves from the term and discourage its use as being too biased to be accurate. Some fear it may lead to unfairly pre-judging and maligning unpopular speakers (Roberts-Miller, 2005; see

also Darsey, 2006; Johnson, 2017) who represent ideas and demographics that are not mainstream, but should be given voice in an open society (see for example Goldzwig, 2006).

Nevertheless, as social media began intersecting with inflammatory political rhetoric across all media, prominent communication scholars began to reconsider both the utility and the necessity of applying the demagogue concept with renewed vigor (Roberts-Miller, 2005; Goldzwig, 2006; McDonough, 2018). They advocated for use of the term as a cautionary descriptor in the electoral process, whereas more polite and sensitive adjectives fail to capture the dangerousness of populist messages that inundate conventional mass media, as well as social media back channels. Patricia Roberts-Miller (2005) perspicaciously pointed out a trend of modern day political rhetors, remarking that:

Demagogues polarize a complicated (and often frightening) situation by presenting only two options: their policy, and some obviously stupid, impractical, or shameful one. They almost always insist that “those who are not with us are against us” so that the polarized policy situation also becomes a polarized identity situation. (p. 462)

Johnson (2017) and Ott and Dickinson (2019) validated Roberts-Miller’s (2005) connection of demagoguery to “‘in-group’ thinking” (p. 462, cited in Johnson, p. 230), and, like Roberts-Miller, Goldzwig (2006) and the researchers mentioned above agree with the application of demagoguery to the study of modern political rhetors. Specifically, Goldzwig extols the renewed vigor in this area stating, “In the long run, I firmly believe, such studies enrich our understanding of the complexity of democratic discourse in the United States” (p. 474).

McDonough (2018) also called for a “renewed exploration of the rhetoric of demagoguery” (p. 139), due to its “. . . current mainstreaming and pervasiveness . . .” (p. 139). Like Roberts-Miller, McDonough found significance in how demagoguery had been characterized by rhetorical scholars through the twentieth century. She points to Lomas (1961) who criticized demagogues for persuading through a “complete indifference to truth” (p. 161) and whose “primary motivation is personal gain” (p. 161). McDonough notes the evocative description by Baskerville (1954) of Joseph McCarthy as the definitive demagogue who “. . . misleads the people for personal advantage. In achieving his ends he tells the people what they wish to hear . . .” (p. 9). Finally, like Roberts-Miller, McDonough points to an escalation of political demagoguery in recent years, which McDonough says has been particularly exhibited by candidate and president Donald Trump.

Haverda and Halley (2019) identify candidate-turned-president Trump as both an “authoritarian populist” (p. 203) and as a “demagogue” (p. 204), distinguishing the latter from the former as a pernicious form of manipulation of his followers’ insecurities (see also Johnson, 2017) using allusions to idyllic Americana and nostalgic remembrances of a more empowered era. The authors clearly believe the two terms are connected, both philosophically and politically, yet demagoguery moves into a more paranoid view of establishment (see also Johnson, 2017) and outsiders, and it positions the rhetor as the only hope and genuine representative of the newly-repressed conservative right. Ott and Dickinson (2019) found that “demagoguery easily aligns with authoritarianism and is a powerful response to fear” (p. 34). Also quoting from—and further substantiating—the earlier, perhaps prescient concerns of Roberts-Miller (2005), Ott and Dickinson remind us that “the culture of hatred and fear preexist, and the demagogue uses them” (Roberts-Miller, p. 472, cited in Ott and Dickinson, p. 34).

In this regard, *Politico’s* Jack Shafer (2015), characterized “the standard American demagogue” as one who “. . . relies on anger and resentment to attract supporters . . .” (cited in Johnson, 2017, p. 230). Shafer’s description is both compelling and integral to an understanding

of this type of persona in modern politics. Johnson (2017) specified the emotional instability to which demagoguery panders:

. . . demagoguery figures audiences as risk-averse subjects by converting the shared vulnerability characteristic of public life into a feeling of precariousness. Demagogues encourage audiences to self-identify as victims on the basis of *felt* precarity, encouraging the well-off and privileged to adopt the mantle of victimhood at the expense of those who occupy more objectively fraught positions. (p. 230, emphasis in original)

In particular, Johnson's (2017) research points to the ironic success of Trump's demagoguery, which encourages white, male hegemony to express dissatisfaction with losing its hold on society. Ott and Dickinson (2019) specify that ". . . Trump's rhetoric does the work of demagoguery and does so through the more specific rhetorical style of the affective aesthetics of white rage" (p. 34).

Carter (2019) referred to "negative solidarity" (p. 95), a term most recently evidenced by dissatisfied mainstream (i.e., conservative, white) majorities expressing their newly-found angst on Twitter against a host of progressive social movements. Carter explained that the opportunistic demagogue picks up on and takes full advantage of this angst with appeals that are characterized by "indifference to truth . . . [which is] . . . a greater threat to rational discourse than deliberate dishonesty, which at least takes accuracy into account" (p. 93; see also Mendes, 2016). The demagogue becomes the central figure in a systemic approach to deception that literally normalizes political "bullshit" (Carter, 2019, p. 94) as an acceptable means of derailing dialogue. Carter explained that Trump's rhetoric is part of an elaborate deception that naturalizes "demagogic nonsense" (p. 95), and this paralyzes open and fair discussions by mischaracterizing all disagreements as misinformation (see also Mendes, 2016; McDonough, 2018). Barring alternative opinions leads to the artificially constructed *us-them* separation that Roberts-Miller described.

Integrative Complexity and the Creation of In-Groups and Out-Groups

Schroder, Driver, and Streufert (1967) made significant contributions to understanding how people interpret and adapt to new information in a learning environment. The researchers found that learning is precipitated by introducing individuals to increasingly complex properties of existing structures. Then they facilitated learners' integrations of multiple properties within a system of knowledge. Further, Schroder et al. characterized learning as increasingly understanding concepts with more abstractness and being less locked into concrete representations in one's thinking overall.

Years later, Linville (1982) identified complexity as key to understanding and interpreting (i.e., learning about) other people with whom one is unfamiliar (out-groups), concluding that "complex persons are more likely than simple ones to . . . include both favorable and unfavorable attributes in their description of another person . . ." (p. 195). In other words, more complexity in knowledge structure and in thinking will lead to more balanced (i.e., less extreme) evaluations of out-groups. However, Tetlock, Peterson, and Berry (1993) were concerned that prior research had perhaps created an oversimplified and overly-flattering "portrait of integratively complex thinkers" (p. 501). They nevertheless affirmed that such thinkers are less likely to "[jump] to conclusions" (p. 501) and tend to ". . . hold balanced, nuanced, and moderate positions in political controversies . . ." (p. 501).

Linville (1982) found that "people . . . tend to categorize others in terms of in-group and out-group membership" (p. 193). But while it may be a natural tendency, Linville warns that it creates a "systematic unidirectional bias" (p. 193), wherein members of one's in-group are viewed more positively than those considered to be part of an out-group. The complexity-extremity model

(see for example Linville, 1982), more recently referred to as integrative complexity theory (see for example Tetlock, 1985; Tetlock et al., 1993; Sotirovic, 2001), provides a meaningful guide for analyzing the phenomenon of self-affiliation with—and apart from—particular groups. Tetlock (1985) identified two key components of integrative complexity theory: “differentiation and integration” (p. 268). His explanations expanded on previous research findings about subjects’ cognitive assessment abilities along a continuum from simple to complex. He also studied their realization and comprehension of multiple, often interacting perspectives for evaluating situations and challenges.

Tetlock’s (1985) research solidifies findings that the more multi-dimensional (i.e., complex) one’s reasoning, the more integrative her/his decision making will be. Thus, more integrative thinking should produce more inclusive and less extreme responses. This should result in one being less locked into a “one size fits all,” self-centered, unreflective narrative from which to operate. Further, Tetlock reported that in a series of studies in the 1980s of conservative, moderate, and liberal political leaders he repeatedly found ample evidence that those who held extreme positions on either end of the spectrum tended to evince significantly less complex thinking regarding the supporting tenets of their arguments. Conversely, Tetlock detailed four laudatory characteristics that the “integratively complex politician” (p. 276) tends to exhibit:

(a) deemphasiz[ing] the differences between the major political parties; (b) be[ing] tolerant of opposing viewpoints; (c) think[ing] about issues in relatively nonideological terms; and (d) be[ing] unconcerned with assigning blame for societal problems. In short, integrative complexity was associated with a pragmatic, open-minded and non-partisan world view.” (p. 278)

Sotirovic (2001) also tied the research on complexity and extremity of attitudes to the creation and assessment of member groups and non-member groups. Research regarding extreme assessments of groups with which one is not affiliated or familiar (out-groups) points to lack of knowledge as the primary predictor. Specifically, the lack of reliable information through contact, education, and interpersonal experience results in fewer cognitive dimensions along which to evaluate members of unfamiliar groups. Consequently, fewer evaluative dimensions greatly increase the tendency to rely on assumptions drawn from a few, non-representative features and casual observations. These assumptions tend to be markedly more severe (i.e. extreme), whether positive or negative, and lead to the creation and perpetuation of stereotypes.

Further, the concept of in-groups and out-groups has been studied, not only in terms of how in-groups evaluate outsiders (i.e., non-members), but also in terms of how in-groups evaluate their own members (see for example Hildebrand, DeMotta, Sen, and Kongsompong, 2013). Harmon-Kizer (2016) found that in-group members are, in fact, performing “assimilation and contrast effects . . . simultaneously” (p. 326), so as to continually reassess whether their peers are “likeable” or not (Wang, 2009, p 2; Harmon-Kizer, 2016, p. 326). This likeability is based largely on in-group members’ perceived similarity to their peers’ self-constructed identities. Those perceived as not fully emblematic of the in-group’s identity may be ostracized, much like members of out-groups (see Wang, 2009; Harmon-Kizer, 2016).

For this reason, dividing political and social groups into taken for granted, “common sense,” non-self-critical categories (i.e., stereotypes) results in power for some and marginalization for others. For example, Smith-Frigerio and Houston (2019) found that President Trump “overtly” (p. 123) used a “stigmatizing term” (p. 123) in over half of the tweets they studied, and he used “derogatory terms . . . on a casual basis” (p. 123) in more than one-third of the tweets they studied. Specifically, the researchers found that the president used negative characterizations “to discredit

and disparage his opponents . . . [and] . . . to make himself appear stronger” (p. 124). In particular, they found Trump used “stigmatizing terms concerning mental illness on Twitter” (p. 123) to marginalize opponents and to create a perception of weakness for the public about numerous individuals in the spotlight. For example, Trump frequently employed slang terms, such as “stupid. . . dumb” (p. 124), “crazy” (p. 123), “insane” (p. 125), “wacko. . . dummy. . . and basket case. . .” (p. 124) that have long been used as stereotypes of people with mental health issues. Cummings (2019) explained that the activity of tweeting often encourages participants to “. . . [build] on implicit assumptions” (p. 54), without critically evaluating the premises behind them, thus fostering racial and cultural stereotypes and, simultaneously, fostering stronger ties to in-group affiliations. This can validate and promote one’s own narrow self-image while devaluing that of others.

The “Us” and “Them” Language of the Demagogue

For Harmon-Kizer (2016), social identity theory explains that people voluntarily identify as—and affiliate themselves with—those whom they perceive to have similar mindsets and outward characteristics. In so doing, people who associate together (into groups) simultaneously strengthen each other’s common identity and further disassociate from members of groups with conflicting or competing characteristics. Thus, the tighter the affiliation, the less diverse (and likely, less complex) are the interaction paradigms. It is this tendency for the eschewing of complexity in evaluating outsiders that triggers the demagogue’s populist appeal.

In the context of this research, it is understood that political rhetors use populist appeals to both encourage and exploit the natural tendency of their audiences to align themselves with in-groups and to shun out-groups. This language is herein examined as emblematic of the demagogue. In his analysis of Joseph McCarthy as the exemplar demagogue, Baskerville (1954) pointed out that, from a McCarthy-esque viewpoint, sophisticated thinking which refuses to adopt a simple Manichean binary (e.g., right or wrong) for every construction is inherently untrustworthy. Later, Lomas (1961) succinctly connected the demagogue’s reliance on simplistic language to his motivations to stereotype others, stating:

The demagogue also believes in simplicity, but he carries it to absurdity; he oversimplifies and, as a result, his audiences understand him well. He seems to be stating merely the obvious, but in reality he is substituting prejudice and half-truth for fact. (p. 163)

More recently, Mendes (2016) clearly demonstrated with examples going back prior to the 2016 election that Donald Trump consistently employs three rhetorical appeals associated with demagogues, namely “scapegoating,” “paranoia,” and “authority” (p. 64). Referring, in part, Healy and Haberman (2015), Mendes pointed out that Trump’s “. . . manner of describing outgroups such as immigrants, Muslims, and refugees relies heavily on ‘us/them’ dichotomous language and ‘harsh words and violent imagery’ (Mendes, 2016, pp. 65-66). More recently, Ott and Dickinson (2019) found that demagoguery is one of three consistent aspects of Trump’s “linguistic style” (p. 47), reaffirming Roberts-Miller’s explanation of the term as “‘polarizing propaganda that motivates members of an ingroup to hate and scapegoat some outgroup(s)’ . . .” (p. 462, cited in Ott and Dickinson, p. 47).

McDonough (2018) also identified scapegoating as key to Trump’s demagogic rhetoric that isolates out-groups. She cites two key truisms about scapegoating by Kenneth Burke (1974) who stated that “‘Every movement that would recruit its followers from among many discordant and divergent bands, must have some spot towards which all roads lead,’ (Burke, p. 192) and that

a movement must also have its devil, for ‘men who can unite on nothing else can unite on the basis of a foe shared by all’” (Burke, 193; both cited in McDonough, p. 144) Further, McDonough maintained that, whenever Trump has needed to cast himself in a positive light vis-à-vis oppositional groups, he typically makes broadly sweeping, negative characterizations to scapegoat the *other(s)*. In this regard, Trump has scapegoated not only Democrats and illegal immigrants, but other countries, branches within the U.S. government, politicians in general, and even the entire United States, remarking how bad it had become. The latter two he especially did while campaigning as the outsider without political experience who singularly held the key for improvement.

Reflecting on the NFL kneeling controversy of 2017 and the president’s characterization of some players as unpatriotic, Colley (2019) identified the strategy of division as integral to President Trump’s rhetoric:

Through the ‘us vs. them,’ ‘we’re right, they’re wrong’ dichotomy that Trump consistently employs, he successfully banded his audience against a common adversary, a strategy that primes them to work not on behalf of the nation but on behalf of Trump. (pp. 38-39)

McDonough (2018) found that even when communicating with his supporters, Trump prefers to use “I” and “you,” instead of “us,” (p. 148), thus exhibiting his penchant for “alienating” over “community building” (p. 148). She determined this signifies that his language “polariz[es]” and is intended to bolster his “autocratic” mindset (p. 148).

Finally, Cummings (2019) explained that, for Trump, “Twitter becomes a mechanism for deliberately altering reality through discourse” (p. 54). In this regard, Cummings pointed specifically to the *us-them* dichotomies enacted and empowered by Trump in the way he employs language on Twitter. For example, Trump’s penchant for the loser-winner binary quickly polarizes readers to align with or to reject altogether his definitions of such terms. With his tweets the president promotes a convenient transposition of contexts for any given situation, by which one can shift into her/his own positive personal reality by changing definitions in their language to suit their own purposes. This tends to attract like-minded followers who enjoy believing that solutions to complex issues come through simplifying the way we express them (Cummings, 2019).

In light of the research on political demagoguery and due to what is perceived as the increased presence of divisive *us-them* rhetoric in the 2020 presidential campaign, this study posits the following research questions:

RQ1: Has President Donald Trump communicated more via Twitter than his political contemporaries?

1a. More than the 2020 Democratic candidates for president?

1b. More than current world leaders?

1c. More than people in his own administration?

1d. More than members of the Senate and House (of both parties)?

RQ2: Has President Trump tweeted more than any one politician who averaged at least two tweets per day?

RQ3: Has President Trump tweeted one of seven key demagogic terms more than any one politician?

RQ4: Has President Trump tweeted one of the favorite demagogic terms of Republicans or Democrats more than the top tweeters in each group?

RQ5: Which demagogic terms has President Trump tweeted the most?

5a. Which phrases has Trump used most often?

- 5b. Which “I” terms has Trump used most often?
5c. Which hashtags has Trump used most often?

Methods

All references to Twitter use by the politicians in this study was obtained through the official twitter.com website, including the month and year the account was started and the total number of tweets made from the initial month/year through July 21, 2019. This date is the two-and-one-half-year mark of President Trump’s presidency, against whose Twitter record every other account was compared throughout this study. Only an official (i.e., checked) Twitter account was used for each politician. For the few who had two official accounts, the account for their most recent office was utilized, and for the 2020 candidates, their official presidential campaign Twitter page was used. For only Donald Trump and Mike Pence were both the pre-election and post-inauguration accounts tabulated, given that the current administration is the focus of this study.

Specifically, the first day of the month was used for the starting month of all politicians’ Twitter account, except when considering Trump’s in-office period. (Even though this might add a dozen or so bogus days into the total calculation, it would not be mathematically significant, considering the number of years each person was active.) Excel was used to calculate the number of days each account was active, and this number was *divided into* the total number of tweets during this time, as indicated by Twitter, to yield the average number of tweets per day (tpd) for each politician. For example, if someone had been active for 30 days and had 60 tweets, 30 *divided into* 60 would indicate an average of two tweets per day (2 tpd).

To answer the various components of RQ1, several sources were consulted to find the politicians whose tweets were compared to those from President Trump. For Table 1, the names of the 25 Democratic presidential candidates, as well as the two Republican presidential candidates (Trump and Bill Weld), were tracked through the summer of 2019 via “Ballotpedia” (ballotpedia.org), and the names of those listed as of August, 2019, were included in Table 1. Several Democratic candidates have since withdrawn, and some Republicans have *entered* the presidential contest. However, the August cutoff point prevented these later Republicans from being included, but since the Democrats who dropped out are still politicians and are still active on Twitter in some regard, their posts remained relevant to this study for both thematic and frequency analyses.

Most of the names of foreign leaders, as well as the members of the U.S. House and Senate, were garnered from “Ranker” (ranker.com) according to their list of “The Most Important Politicians in 2019” during the summer of 2019. This list is continually changing, and people have moved up and down or off the list, but the listing provided a basis for choosing which politicians were ultimately included on Table 2. For world leaders who were on the list but had left office, their successors’ Twitter accounts were considered, instead, when available. Nevertheless, official Twitter accounts for several foreign leaders listed on Ranker were unable to be found, due to both language barriers—despite the use of Google translate—and bogus/parody accounts for some. Finally, the various members of Trump’s own cabinet were chosen by the researcher due to their perceived visibility in the press and/or their relative status within the administration.

While Table 2 lists the various politicians by like groups, Table 3 rank orders the top 38 (Trump and 37 others) from highest to lowest number of average tweets per day (tpd), ending with those having only 2 tpd, although lower averages were recorded (see Table 2). Each name on Table 3 was searched using Twitter’s archive feature (twitter.com/search-advanced) to check how many times each politician used one of seven demagogic-associated terms during the 922 days (2.5

years) that Donald Trump had been president (i.e., from January 21, 2017-July 21, 2019), in order to compare their use of the terms to Trump's during this time in office. Only a few people on the list started using Twitter after the beginning of this time period; however, their tallies are still considered important to this research. The seven demagogic terms were drawn from numerous prior studies of the president's tweets both by this researcher and other political communication and social media scholars. They epitomize the rhetoric of authoritarian-populism used to elicit audience self-identifying separations along *us-them* political lines. The terms, in no particular order, are as follows: enemy, destroy, our country, freedom, our economy, truth, and rights.

Identifying President Trump's favorite Twitter expressions involved dividing them into three main categories. Previous studies by this researcher and other scholars have indicated a tendency for the president to invoke certain terms, "I" statements, and hashtags repeatedly. The terms included herein were chosen to highlight their use by the president in a demagogic context, as discussed in the literature review above.

Results

During his first two and a half years in office (January 21, 2017-July 21, 2019) President Donald Trump sent 9,122 tweets over a period of 912 days, which averaged to 10.00 tweets per day (tpd). His overall tweet total since becoming active (March, 2009-July, 2019) was considerably higher, at 43,200, and averaged slightly higher than his in-office tweet average, at 11.48 tpd (see Table 1). Thus, with the exception of one 2020 Democratic candidate for president, Cory Booker, RQ1a was answered overwhelmingly in the affirmative, as Trump's tpd averages were dramatically higher than the tpd averages for every 2020 Democratic candidate for president (as of summer 2019), except Booker, whose tpd was 16.12. The second highest tpd among 2020 Democratic contenders was that of Kirsten Gillibrand, at 5.28. All other 2020 contenders had a tpd of 4.5 or less; specifically, only three (12.0%) of the 2020 contenders had tpd's between 4.3 and 4.5; only five (20.0%) had tpd's between 3.0 and 3.9, six (24%) had tpd's between 2.3 and 2.9; and nine (36%) had tpd's below 2.0 (see Table 1).

Likewise, RQ1b, RQ1c, and RQ1d were all answered overwhelmingly in the affirmative, as Trump's tpd averages were dramatically higher than the tpd averages for eleven current world leaders, eight people in his own administration, and seventeen members of the Senate and House (of both parties). Of the eleven world leaders included in this study, India P.M. Modi and Canada P.M. Trudeau had considerably higher tweet totals and tpd's than the nine others, with 24,100 (6.30 tpd) and 24,300 (5.89 tpd), respectively. Although both of their totals far exceed Trump's in-office tweet totals, because of the longer time frame, their tpd's were considerably lower than Trump's in-office 10.00 tpd. Of the remaining nine world leaders in this study, only two others had tpd's of 2.0 or higher, namely, Cuba President Bermudez and Brazil President Bolsonaro, with 2.95 and 2.13 tpd's, respectively (see Table 2).

In Trump's own administration, only V.P. Pence's 7.59 tpd (but not his overall total, 6920) since the election has approached that of the president. Only two other administration officials who were included in this study had tpd's of 2.0 or higher, namely, Secretary of State Pompeo and Secretary of Defense Esper, who had very similar tpd's of 2.45 and 2.43, respectively. Secretary of HUD Carson had a tpd of 1.74, and the remaining four had tpd's below 1.0. None of the officials included (except for Pence) had an overall tweet total over 2,000 (compared to Trump's 9,122); however, Carson and Pompeo had totals over 1,000, with 1,516 and 1,097, respectively (see Table 2).

For the seventeen members of the Senate and House included in this study, tpd's were considerably higher than those of the world leaders and Trump administration members mentioned above. By far, the highest in this group of politicians in both tweet total and tpd was New York Democratic Governor Cuomo (25,800/8.26). Following Cuomo, the next highest totals and tpd generally did not match up, in that those with higher totals often did not have the highest tpd's, due to their starting date on Twitter (see Table 2); thus, only tpd's are reported hereafter, as they are much more indicative of each politician's frequency of use and overall consistency of activity. Only two others had tpd's over 5.0, namely, Democratic Senators Baldwin and Sinema, with 5.59 and 5.08, respectively. Three had tpd's between 4.0 and 5.0, namely, Republican Senators Cruz, Scott, and Paul, with 4.61, 4.16, and 4.15, respectively. Three had tpd's between 3.0 and 4.0, namely, Senators Schumer (D), Graham (R), and Feinstein (D), with 3.96, 3.55, and 3.29, respectively. Finally, five had tpd's between 2.0 and 3.0, namely, Republicans Rubio and McCarthy and Democrats Newsom, Ocasio-Cortez, and Pelosi, with 2.89, 2.80, 2.68, 2.57, and 2.31, respectively. This last group had the lowest tpd levels to be included on Table 3 (below), regarding their propensity to use demagogic terms. Perhaps surprisingly, included in this lower tpd tier are two of Trump's most vocal and vociferous critics, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi and Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez. The remaining three in the Senate/House group had tpd's below 2.0. Thus, referring to the findings reported herein and to all those shown on Table 2, RQ2 is also answered overwhelmingly in the affirmative, with the exception—as with RQ1a—of 2020 Democratic presidential candidate Cory Booker.

RQ3 and RQ4 produced mixed results, both affirmative and negative; nevertheless, the differences between the various groups are illustrative of their political differences and possible demagogic tendencies regarding the terms included in this study. By far the most commonly found term among all politicians was “our country,” with 2,634 occurrences (33.07% of all occurrences, across all seven categories). President Trump's individual total in this category alone was 522 (19.82% of all “our country” occurrences), which far exceeded any other individual occurrence in this category. The next seven highest totals were all from 2020 Democratic presidential contenders, namely, Harris, Klobuchar, Gillibrand, Moulton, DeBlasio, O'Rourke, and Delaney, with 153 (5.81%), 141 (5.35%), 140 (5.32%), 123 (4.67%), 120 (4.56%), 117 (4.44%), and 113 (4.29%), respectively. All other individuals had fewer than 100 mentions of the phrase during the 30-month period of Trump's presidency (January 21, 2017-July 21, 2019). It should be noted that two of the president's most consistent and staunchest Democratic rivals, House Speaker Pelosi and NY Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (AOC), had a combined total of only 62, which made up only 2.35% of all “our country” occurrences; however, their total amounted to 11.88% of Trump's total here (See Table 3).

The “our country” category also had the highest tweet totals for all Democrats combined, as well as for all 2020 Democratic presidential contenders combined, with 1711 (64.96%) and 1333 (50.61%), respectively. It was the second highest category for all Republicans combined and for all foreign leaders combined, with 303 (11.50%) and 98 (3.72%), respectively. And although the Democratic totals far outnumber Trump's singular tweet total for this phrase, it should be noted that his 522 occurrences amounted to 30.51% of the all-Democrat total and 39.16% of the 2020 Democratic contenders' total (see Figure 1). Further, Trump's “our country” total amounted to more than twice that of the top four Republicans combined (i.e., 216%), more than five times that of the foreign leaders combined (i.e., 533%), and came to 93.72% of the total for the top four Democrats (and Democratic candidates) combined (see Figure 2). The significance of these findings will be mentioned in the “Discussion” section to follow.

The term “rights” (to be distinguished from “right” and its various meanings) was the overall second most commonly tweeted term among all politicians, with 1,735 occurrences (21.79% of all occurrences, across all seven categories). It had the highest total for all foreign leaders combined (105, 6.05% of all “rights” occurrences), the second highest total for all Democrats combined, as well as for all 2020 Democratic presidential contenders combined, with 1338 (77.12%) and 817 (47.09%), respectively. It was the third highest category for all Republicans combined (273, 15.73%), “freedom” being the highest. However, this category had the lowest Trump singular tweet total (19, 1.10%) (see Figure 1). Only about one-quarter of the other 37 politicians had lower totals for this term (9/37, 24.32%). Further, Trump’s “rights” total amounted to only 9.36% of the top four Republicans combined, 18.10% of the foreign leaders combined, 4.69% of the total for the top four Democrats, and 5.35% for the top four Democratic candidates combined, respectively. Both Pelosi and AOC had their highest individual occurrences in this category by at least double, and their combined “rights” total was 155, which made up 8.93% of all “rights” occurrences (see Figure 2). Ironically perhaps, in reverse to the “our country” findings above, Trump’s “rights” total amounted to only 12.26% of the Pelosi-AOC total here. The significance of these findings will be mentioned in the “Discussion” section to follow.

The term “freedom” was the overall third most commonly tweeted term among all politicians, with 1,415 occurrences (17.77% of all occurrences, across all seven categories). It had the highest total for all Republicans combined (568, 40.14% of all “freedom” occurrences), and the fourth highest totals for all Democrats combined, for all 2020 Democratic presidential contenders combined, and for all foreign leaders combined, with 692 (48.90%), 470 (33.22%), and 93 (6.57%), respectively (see Figure 1). Trump’s individual “freedom” total was his third highest at 62, and was higher than all but six other politicians, i.e., four Republicans, one Democrat, and one foreign leader; thus, his “freedom” total was higher than 81.58% of all others’ individual “freedom” totals. However, Trump’s “freedom” total amounted to only 14.25% of the total for the top four Republicans combined, 25.31% of the total for the top four Democrats combined, and 26.84% of the total for the top four Democratic candidates combined, respectively. Trump’s total did come to 66.67% of the total for the foreign leaders combined (see Figure 2). The Pelosi-AOC total in this category was 46, which made up 3.25% of all “freedom” occurrences; however, their total amounted to nearly three-fourths (74.19%) of Trump’s total here. The significance of these findings will be mentioned in the “Discussion” section to follow.

The term “truth” was the overall fourth most commonly tweeted term among all politicians, with 976 occurrences (12.26% of all occurrences, across all seven categories). It had the second lowest totals, both for all Republicans combined and for all foreign leaders combined, with 96 (9.84%) and 10 (1.02%) of all “truth” occurrences, respectively. However, this term had the third highest totals, both for all Democrats combined and for all 2020 Democratic presidential contenders combined, with 821 (84.12%) and 655 (67.11%), respectively (see Figure 1). This category had the third lowest Trump singular tweet total (49, 5.02%); nevertheless, it was higher than all but three other politicians, all of whom were 2020 Democratic contenders. Thus, Trump’s individual “truth” total was higher than 89.47% of all others’ individual “truth” totals. The Pelosi-AOC total in this category was 70, which made up 7.17% of all “truth” occurrences; however, their total amounted to almost one and a half times (1.43) that of Trump’s total here. The significance of these findings will be mentioned in the “Discussion” section to follow.

The term “our economy” was the overall fifth most commonly tweeted term among all politicians, with 726 occurrences (9.12% of all occurrences, across all seven categories). It had the fourth highest total for all Republicans combined and the third highest total for all foreign leaders

combined, with 131 (18.04%) and 95 (13.09%) of all “our economy” occurrences, respectively. However, this term had the third lowest totals, both for all Democrats combined and for all 2020 Democratic presidential contenders combined, with 467 (64.33%) and 287 (39.53%), respectively (see Figure 1). This category had the second lowest Trump singular tweet total (33, 4.55%); nevertheless, it was higher than all but five other politicians, i.e., three Democrats (two being 2020 presidential contenders), one Republican, and one foreign leader. Thus, Trump’s individual “our economy” total was higher than 84.21% of all others’ individual “our economy” totals. The Pelosi-AOC total in this category was 21, which made up 2.89% of all “our economy” occurrences; however, their total amounted to nearly two-thirds (63.64%) of Trump’s total here. The significance of these findings will be mentioned in the “Discussion” section to follow.

The term “enemy” was the overall sixth most commonly tweeted term among all politicians, with 272 occurrences (3.42% of all occurrences, across all seven categories). It had the third lowest totals for all Republicans combined, and it tied with the lowest total for all foreign leaders combined, with 104 (38.24%) and 4 (1.47%) of all “enemy” occurrences, respectively. This term also had the second lowest totals, both for all Democrats combined and for all 2020 Democratic presidential contenders combined, with 114 (41.91%) and 100 (36.76%), respectively (see Figure 1). This category had the fourth highest (and lowest) Trump singular tweet total (50), but this made up nearly one-fifth of all “enemy” occurrences (18.38%); moreover, it was higher than all the other politicians, i.e., nine Republicans, 24 Democrats (including sixteen 2020 candidates), and four foreign leaders who, altogether, averaged only 6.00 in this category. To reiterate, Trump’s individual “enemy” total was higher than 100% of all others’ individual “enemy” totals. The Pelosi-AOC total in this category was 5, which made up only 1.84% of all “enemy” occurrences; consequently, their total amounted to only 10.0% of Trump’s total here. The significance of these findings will be mentioned in the “Discussion” section to follow.

The term “destroy” was the overall seventh (i.e., least) most commonly tweeted term among all politicians, with 206 occurrences (2.59% of all occurrences, across all seven categories). It had the lowest totals for all Republicans combined, for all Democrats combined, for all 2020 Democratic presidential contenders combined, and it tied with the lowest total for all foreign leaders combined, with 44 (21.36%), 93 (45.15%), 57 (27.67%), and 4 (1.94%) of all “destroy” occurrences, respectively (see Figure 1). This category had the second highest Trump singular tweet total (65) which made up nearly one-third of all “destroy” occurrences (31.55%); moreover, it was higher than all the other politicians, i.e., nine Republicans, 24 Democrats (including sixteen 2020 candidates), and four foreign leaders who, altogether, averaged only 3.81 in this category. To reiterate, Trump’s individual “destroy” total was higher than 100% of all others’ individual “destroy” totals. The Pelosi-AOC total in this category was 16, which made up 7.77% of all “destroy” occurrences; nevertheless, their total amounted to nearly one-quarter (24.62%) of Trump’s total here. The significance of these findings will be mentioned in the “Discussion” section to follow.

Regarding RQ5, a content analysis of the 9,122 tweets by the president during his two and a half years in office revealed a proliferation of frequently used keys words (or phrases), “I” statements directing attention to the first person, and key hashtags, all indicative of demagogic language with a propensity to create divisive dialogue. Of all 19 (N = 3,322) key words found, the most prolific, “our country,” was mentioned 522 times (see RQ3 results above) and made up 15.71% of all 19 terms. “Our country” was used 8.80 times more frequently than the second most common term “fake news.” The term “fake news” was mentioned 480 times, made up 14.45% of all 19 terms, and it was used 51.90% more frequently than the third most common term “security.”

The term “security” was mentioned 316 times, made up 9.51% of all 19 terms, but it was used only 6.04% more often than the fourth most common term “trade.” “Trade” was mentioned 298 times and made up only 8.97% of all 19 terms, yet it was used 30.70% more often than the fifth most common term “witch hunt.” “Witch hunt” was mentioned 228 times and made up 6.86% of all 19 terms. Thus, the top five terms made up more than half (55.51%, $n = 1844$) of all uses of the 19 terms studied herein (see Figure 3).

Together with the top five terms above, the next four terms constituted the nine most used words and phrases studied herein. These nine terms accounted for just over three-fourths of all uses of the 19 terms (76.28%, $n = 2534$). The sixth most common term “fight” was mentioned 217 times, made up 6.53% of all 19 terms, and it was used 32.32% more frequently than the seventh most common term “obstruct.” The term “obstruct” was mentioned 164 times, made up 4.94% of all 19 terms, but it was used just 3.80% more often than the eighth most common term “protect.” “Protect” was mentioned 158 times, made up 4.76% of all 19 terms, and it was used just 4.64% more often than the ninth most common term “no collusion.” “No collusion” was mentioned 151 times and made up 4.55% of all 19 terms (see Figure 3).

Finally, the analyses of Trump “I” statements and, in particular, Trump hashtags, yielded totals for only a few phrases that far exceeded all others, and the remaining phrases had rather innocuous totals (see Figures 4 and 5); nevertheless, even a low amount of certain phrases may be somewhat telling for the purposes of this research. Of all 15 ($N = 1,116$) “I” statements found, only two totals were over 200 (“I am” and “I will”); one total was between 100-200 (“I have”), and four totals were between 50-100 (“I want,” “I was,” “I would,” and “I did”). Altogether, these seven phrases made up over four-fifths (82.35%, $n = 919$) of all occurrences of the 15 “I” statement findings (see Figure 4). The search for favorite presidential hashtags resulted in one overwhelmingly high total (#MAGA), which made up 46.00% ($n = 190$) of all occurrences of the 11 ($N = 413$) hashtag findings. The #MAGA total was 322.22% larger than even the second highest hashtag total (#Hurricane), which made up only 10.90% ($n = 45$) of all 11 hashtag findings. Nevertheless, the subsequent totals were much more tightly grouped, the third highest hashtag total (#USA) being only 13.33% lower than the previous total, making up 9.44% ($n = 39$) of all hashtag findings. The fourth highest hashtag total (#America) was 33.33% lower than the previous, making up 6.30% ($n = 26$) of all hashtag findings. The fifth highest hashtag total (#Tax) was 7.69% lower than the previous, making up 5.81% ($n = 24$) of all hashtag findings. The sixth highest hashtag total (#Trump) was 8.33% lower than the previous, making up 5.33% ($n = 22$) of all hashtag findings. Together, the six highest hashtag totals made up over four-fifths (83.78%, $n = 346$) of all hashtag totals used in this study (see Figure 5).

Discussion

With relatively few exceptions across numerous categories in the overall findings, RQ’s 1-4 were answered convincingly in the affirmative. This is a clear indication that President Trump exceeded both his Republican and Democratic peers, both in the preponderance of his tweets sent and, more importantly, in the demagogic style and language of his tweets. Previous research has shown that one of the telltale signs of authoritarian populist and, hence, demagogic communication is the need to dominate a discussion by literally drowning out opposing viewpoints. In this regard, Trump exhibited his penchant for outtalking virtually all politicians on Twitter, including the massive field of 2020 Democratic presidential candidates, members of his own administration, House and Senate members from both parties, and even numerous foreign leaders. Perhaps most curious here is that not even Trump’s own inner circle (including Mike Pence) or other closely-

aligned Republicans have followed his prolific lead in utilizing Twitter to dominate with their political viewpoints or to demonize alternate viewpoints that question the status quo.

Nevertheless, likely more telling are *which* terms Trump excelled in tweeting, compared to his peers on both sides of the political aisle. The term “our country” was found to be highly popular among all groups studied, yet Trump’s use of it was so extraordinarily high that it exceeded the use by numerous individuals combined. This is significant because the use of the phrase by any political rhetor belies the intention to convince audiences that s/he best understands, embraces, and is able to protect the collective national interests of all Americans. It is this protectionist ruse that so enamors those receptive to a demagogue’s platform and that, perhaps better than other rhetorical ploys, staunchly repels disbelievers and immediately divides the electorate along conventional party lines.

In the second most prolific category overall, “rights,” President Trump distinguished himself in a different way. That this term had Trump’s lowest individual total indicates, again in very demagogic fashion, his eschewing the concept of individual rights, as well as the rights of marginalized groups and social activists seeking access to political influence. While it is unremarkable that Democrats, in contrast, had some of their highest totals for “rights,” international leaders and Republicans overall also had notably high totals here, including Vice President Mike Pence, whose individual total was about double that of the president’s. This is clear evidence that all the politicians studied herein were establishing ideological positions in direct opposition to the president in this area, including some of his closest allies, or at least they were making the effort to appear in favor of “rights” for all in their Twitter personae.

The terms “freedom,” “truth,” and “our economy” saw Trump’s totals generally in the middle of the pack of all results, considering foreign leaders and politicians on both sides of the aisle. Nevertheless, the context in which his findings were situated are worth noting. Specifically, “freedom” was prominent in Republican tweets (including Trump’s) and relatively infrequent in Democratic and international tweets, while the reverse was generally true for the term “truth,” ranking high for Democrats (and especially Pelosi-AOC), but not for Republicans (including Trump) or foreign leaders. This illustrates one prominent rallying strategy of the demagogue: to promise and to emphasize the importance of freedom from an unspecified oppressor and to deemphasize facts and rational thinking about the tenets of the rhetor’s arguments. It is clear that Donald Trump’s political strategy has increasingly relied on suppressing the natural skepticism of his audiences, while simultaneously—and ironically—heightening audience paranoia about having their personal freedoms suppressed or taken away altogether.

Likewise, “our economy” ranked near the middle for both Republicans and internationals, but relatively low for both Democrats and Trump. Nevertheless, as with “truth,” the Pelosi-AOC total for “our economy” compared strongly to Trump’s individual total. And, as with “rights,” it should be noted that V.P. Pence’s totals on “freedom” and “our economy” was about double those of the president’s. Unlike more abstract and subjective terms, such as “freedom” and “truth,” speaking (or tweeting) about the economy requires actual knowledge and, for candidates seeking office, promoting a specific plan that can be challenged on its merits runs the risk of failure. Thus, it should not be surprising that political power seekers would steer widely around this contested space, the Democrats perhaps more so than their counterparts. Because they seek to reestablish themselves in policy-making positions they cannot afford to lock themselves out of potential opportunities.

Trump’s total for the term “enemy” ranked directly in the middle (i.e., the median) of those studied. Nevertheless, it was his fourth highest total, and it consisted of one-fifth of all the

occurrences of the term. No other individuals or combined totals from either side of the aisle or abroad produced totals (or averages) that compared significantly to Trump's use of the word. This is the category wherein it is perhaps most evident that the president, far more than even his own staff and political party, has a penchant for naming and calling out people as "enemies" who disagree with him, who represent alternative viewpoints, and/or whom he considers to be formidable political opponents.

As with "our country" and "rights," Trump set himself apart from everyone with his use of the term "destroy." For all politicians, including Trump's inner circle, this term had the lowest individual and combined totals. It was, however, Trump's second highest total (following "our country"). As mentioned above, "freedom" and "enemy" were found to be his third and fourth highest totals, respectively, and the demagogic logic behind the proliferation of these four terms, in particular, is apparent. The rhetoric of the demagogue seeks above all to unify the audience within an unreasoned and unreflective fear that our enemies are actively seeking to destroy our country and our freedoms, and hence, in response, they must also be destroyed, or at the very least, separated from us and removed far away, out of sight and out of mind. This effectively positions the demagogue to characterize whom s/he wishes as "the enemy" and, thus, as dangerous and destructive, along whichever dimensions best suit the political situation *de jure*. This concern about destroying or being destroyed did not seem to be taken up by even the most conservative (i.e., nationalistic) Republicans and rests solely in the mind—and tweets—of Donald Trump.

Finally, RQ5 led to the discovery of numerous terms created by and/or favored by Trump, which were both prevalent in his day-to-day Twitter communication and indicative of his preference for demagogic-style, divisive rhetoric. The terms found in this section of the research also indicate that the president consistently communicates through tweets in a manner that controls the focus and scope of the social "dialogue." His ego-centric manipulation of the facts and parameters of the "conversation" helps him to position himself at the center of the dialogue which he usually initiates and which tightly orbits around his perception of a situation, event, or person. In essence, each tweet by the president is another line in a monologue or one-man play which neither invites nor thoughtfully considers interaction in any meaningful way. The audience for each tweet may agree, disagree, and/or pass the message along, but their so-called social media "conversation" with the chief executive is, in reality, a dialogue with only themselves. No one is truly listening, reacting, or responding in any meaningful way.

The significance of this research lies not in being able to definitively conclude that President Donald Trump meets the criteria for being a "demagogue" or that he excels most, if not all, of his political contemporaries domestically and abroad in this regard. Because the term itself has been—and continues to be—questioned by political and rhetorical scholars alike it is unlikely that one set of characteristics will be applied to similar analyses in the near future. Nevertheless, the data collected, analyzed, and compared herein indicate a strong predilection on the part of the president to repeat certain terms known to resonate with his base and with his party. These terms are also likely to divide his Twitter followers along stringent ideological lines. It is these divisions on which Trump capitalizes and then re-inserts into subsequent tweets to create a self-aggrandizing echo chamber that impedes logical exploration of topics along any dimension not already established—or allowed—within the narrow confines of the point at hand.

Conclusion

This study has compared the Twitter use and content of numerous domestic and international politicians with that of current U.S. President Donald J. Trump for the purpose of

perspective. The tweets of other prolific politicians have been revealing and heuristically compelling in and of themselves. But some comparisons have provided mixed results and may not have always shown a clear delineation of ideologies along party lines. However, the findings reported herein indicate that Trump, far more than his contemporaries, has consistently employed terminology in a manner and frequency that would advance a demagogic agenda, and then some. Simply put, the primary objective of this research endeavor has been to determine a reliable answer to the following question: Is Trump the biggest demagogue of all politicians, in terms of his Twitter communication? The answer is yes.

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Name	Start	Total Tweets	Ave TPD
Donald Trump	3/2009 1/2017	43,200 9122	11.48 10.00
Bill Weld	5/2016	485	.42
Michael Bennet	6/2009	1889	.51
Joe Biden	3/2007	2237	.50
Bill de Blasio	1/2009	15,200	3.98
Cory Booker	8/2008	64,100	16.12
Steve Bullock	2/2010	6808	1.98
Pete Buttigieg	12/2010	9308	2.98
Julian Castro	1/2009	9471	2.48
John Delaney	12/2011	8334	3.02
Tulsi Gabbard	3/2009	9086	2.41
Kirsten Gillibrand	9/2009	18,900	5.28
Mike Gravel*	5/2008	2681	.66
Kamala Harris	4/2009	11,600	3.11
John Hickenlooper	2/2010	4021	1.17
Jay Inslee	2/2009	5079	1.34
Amy Klobuchar	4/2009	9417	2.52
Wayne Messam	4/2009	8789	2.35
Seth Moulton	2/2011	10,900	3.56
Beto O'Rourke	7/2011	6894	2.37
Tim Ryan	1/2012	4804	1.76
Bernie Sanders	11/2010	14,100	4.47
Joe Sestak	6/2009	3594	.98
Tom Steyer	11/2012	7828	3.23
Elizabeth Warren	8/2011	5284	1.83
Marianne Williamson	2/2009	16,500	4.35
Andrew Yang	12/2013	9247	4.56
AVERAGES		11,388.50	3.55

Table 1. Totals and TPD Averages of 2020 Democratic Presidential Candidates

Name	Position	Start	Total Tw's	TPD Ave
Mike Pence	U.S. VP	2/2009 1/2017	5777 6920	1.52 7.59
Shinzo Abe	Japan PM	1/2012	1712	.63
Jacinda Ardern*	N Zealand PM	3/2009	6929	1.84
Jair Bolsonaro*	Brazil President	3/2010	7240	2.13
Miguel Diaz-Canel Bermudez	Cuba President	8/2018	955	2.95
Abdel Fattah El-Sisi	Egypt President	3/2014	2616	1.35
Theresa May	UK PM	6/2016	1753	1.57
Narendra Modi	India PM	1/2009	24,100	6.30
Scott Morrison*	Australia PM	4/2009	7255	1.94
Benjamin Netanyahu	Israel PM	10/2008	4922	1.26
Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador*	Mexico Pres.	10/2009	4313	1.21
Justin Trudeau	Canada PM	3/2008	24,300	5.89
Mike Pompeo (R)	Secretary of State	4/2018	1097	2.45
Mark T. Esper (R)	Secretary of Defense	6/2019	51	2.43
Steven Mnuchin (R)	Secretary of Treasury	11/2016	788	.82
Wilbur Ross (R)	Secretary/Commerce	2/2017	652	.75
Elaine Chao (R)	Sec/Transportation	1/2017	6	.01
Ben Carson (R)	Secretary of HUD	2/2017	1516	1.74
Betsy DeVos (R)	Secretary of Education	2/2017	854	.98
Nancy Pelosi (D)	Speaker of House	8/2008	9173	2.31
Andrew Cuomo (D)	NY Governor	12/2010	25,800	8.26
Gavin Newsom (D)	CA Governor	12/2007	11,300	2.68
Tammy Baldwin (D)	WI Senator	1/2013	13,200	5.59
Ted Cruz (R)	TX Senator	1/2013	10,900	4.61
Dianne Feinstein (D)	CA Senator	1/2012	8977	3.29
Lindsey Graham (R)	SC Senator	12/2011	9788	3.55
Kevin McCarthy (R)	CA Rep.	1/2009	10,700	2.80
Mitch McConnell (R)	KY Senator	3/2013	3688	1.60
Lisa Murkowski (R)	AK Senator	12/2008	7412	1.92
Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (D)	NY Rep.	4/2010	8665	2.57
Rand Paul (R)	KY Senator	11/2010	13,100	4.15
Marco Rubio (R)	FL Senator	8/2008	11,500	2.89
Chuck Schumer (D)	NY Senator	11/2008	15,400	3.96

Rick Scott (R)	FL Senator	4/2010	14,000	4.16
Kyrsten Sinema (D)	AR Senator	1/2013	12,000	5.08
Maxine Waters (D)	CA Rep.	4/2009	2909	.78
AVERAGES			7899.14	2.85

Table 2. Totals and TPD Averages of Politicians by Group

Name	TPD Ave	Enemy	Destroy	Our Country	Freedom	Our Economy	Truth	Rights
Trump	10.00	50	65	522	62	33	49	19
Booker	16.12	6	4	71	21	4	32	54
Cuomo	8.26	0	4	16	21	9	8	64
Pence	7.59	18	3	75	129	61	28	37
Modi	6.30	1	3	31	76	4	8	28
Trudeau	5.89	0	0	66	16	91	2	77
Baldwin	5.59	0	0	39	49	65	11	22
Gillibrand	5.28	0	1	140	28	41	45	78
Sinema	5.08	1	1	56	9	21	6	14
Cruz	4.61	4	7	74	129	2	21	85
Yang	4.56	3	3	12	112	30	21	13
Sanders	4.47	5	9	61	24	13	16	72
Williamson	4.35	10	11	28	35	8	59	49
Scott	4.16	4	4	61	106	29	3	18
Paul	4.15	4	3	14	34	3	3	38
De Blasio	3.98	0	2	120	19	16	24	56
Schumer	3.96	4	3	60	33	17	35	93
Moulton	3.56	32	4	123	24	17	16	69
Graham	3.55	42	9	17	15	4	3	4
Feinstein	3.29	0	12	85	25	23	13	107
Steyer	3.23	12	9	84	11	14	142	49
Harris	3.11	1	3	153	45	38	152	111
Delaney	3.02	7	3	113	29	24	44	27
Buttigieg	2.98	5	4	22	38	5	12	27
Bermudez	2.95	3	1	1	0	0	0	0
Rubio	2.89	26	13	17	47	17	25	39
McCarthy	2.80	4	3	32	36	14	10	11
Newsom	2.68	4	0	60	39	24	23	66
Ocasio-Cortez	2.57	4	2	17	14	10	25	65
Klobuchar	2.52	4	0	141	21	32	34	43
Castro	2.48	0	0	47	10	2	22	28
Pompeo	2.45	2	2	13	71	1	3	41
Esper	2.43	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Gabbard	2.41	4	1	85	36	28	12	37
O'Rourke	2.37	10	3	117	14	6	20	94
Messam	2.35	1	0	16	3	9	4	10

Pelosi	2.31	1	14	45	32	11	45	90
Bolsonaro	2.13	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
AVERAGES	4.27	7.16	5.42	69.32	37.24	19.11	25.68	45.66

Table 3. Top 39 TPD Averages by Demagogic Topic (January 21, 2017 – July 21, 2019)




Figure 1. Comparing Totals for Seven Demagogic Terms by Trump and Sums of Political Groups




Figure 2. Comparing Totals for Most Used Demagogic Terms by Trump and Top Politicians by Group




Figure 3. Words and Phrases Frequently Used by Trump (Jan. 21, 2017 – July 21, 2019)




Figure 4. "I" Statements Frequently Used by Trump (Jan. 21, 2017 – July 21, 2019)




Figure 5. Hashtags Frequently Used by Trump (Jan. 21, 2017 – July 21, 2019)